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INTRODUCTION

The question presented is …
… whether Indian tribes’ inherent sovereignty includes the ability, endorsed by
Congress, to punish criminals who terrorize Indian victims through domestic
violence or dating violence.
… whether non-Indian defendants should receive the full panoply of federal
constitutional rights when being prosecuted in tribal courts for crimes of domestic
violence or dating violence.
These twin “questions presented” are on the table as the nation waits to
see whether courts will uphold the provisions in the Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA 2013) that give Indian tribes
“special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” over non-Indian
defendants.1 Given the current tribal–federal framework,2 answering “yes”
1 See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §§ 904, 908,
127 Stat. 54, 120-23, 125-26 (Mar. 7, 2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 & note on effective dates
and pilot project (Supp. 2013)) (authorizing “[t]ribal jurisdiction over crimes of domestic
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to both questions presented is impossible. One of the two interests—
inherent tribal sovereignty or non-Indian defendants’ full federal
constitutional rights—must be compromised.
Special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction for Indian tribes took
effect nationally on March 7, 2015,3 and it was a historic moment for the
tribes. Ever since the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, tribes had been powerless to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. 4 Because the Court held that
“Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish nonIndians,”5 an unfortunate gap in enforcement resulted: for crimes committed
in Indian country, where states’ criminal jurisdiction is limited6 and where

violence,” as well as “pilot projects” for tribes that showed readiness to implement such
jurisdiction “on an accelerated basis”); see also Tom Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes:
Should Non-Indians Be Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority Under VAWA?, ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, July 2012, at 40, 44 (opining that special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction brings “significant constitutional and prudential questions that will
likely have to be tested at the highest levels”).
2 See infra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
3 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 908(b)(1), 127 Stat. at 125
(declaring that special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, as described in section 904 of
VAWA 2013, will take effect [n]ot later than“2 years after the date of enactment”).
4 See 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (“By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the
United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”).
5 Id. at 212.
6 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (holding that state law “can have
no force” within Indian country); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 6.01[2] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) (explaining how the Worcester holding has endured for
state criminal jurisdiction over Indians, even as Indian country has become more integrated with
non-Indian lands).
States do, however, retain criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants in Indian country.
See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881) (holding that a state could exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians “throughout the whole of the territory within its limits,”
which extends to any Indian reservations therein); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, supra, § 6.01[3] (explaining that, though the McBratney decision is “far from clear,” its rule
“remains valid as precedent”); id. § 9.03[1] (noting that McBratney is “settled precedent” and is
consistently followed in state criminal prosecutions of non-Indians for offenses against non-Indian
victims).
Certain states also have statutory criminal jurisdiction over Indian defendants under Public
Law 280. As originally enacted, Public Law 280 gave Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin criminal jurisdiction within Indian country, though these states may now
“retrocede” this grant of jurisdiction back to the federal government. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a)
(2012); Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, sec. 2, § 1162(a), 67 Stat. 588, 588 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012)); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2012) (authorizing retrocession).
The Public Law 280 framework was amended in 1968 to give other states the option to assume
Public Law 280 jurisdiction over Indian defendants in Indian country, if these added states
obtained tribal consent. See Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 401(a), 82 Stat. 73, 78
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the federal government lacks the resources to prosecute crimes effectively,7
non-Indian offenders regularly escaped prosecution. 8 This problem was
particularly disturbing in the context of domestic violence and related
crimes. For example, sixty-seven percent of the sexual abuse and related
offenses committed in Indian country and charged in fiscal years 2005–2009
were left unprosecuted by the federal government.9
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2012)); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, supra, § 6.04[3][a] (discussing Public Law 280 and its subsequent history).
Despite McBratney and Public Law 280, states by and large cannot or do not prosecute nonIndians for offenses committed against Indian victims—and domestic violence crimes committed
by non-Indians on Indian victims make up the majority of domestic violence crimes in Indian
country. See sources cited infra note 8.
7 See S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 (2012) (noting that federal law enforcement authorities are
sometimes “hours away and are often without the tools or resources needed to appropriately
respond to domestic violence crimes while also addressing large-scale drug trafficking, organized
crime, and terrorism cases”); Ryan D. Dreveskracht, House Republicans Add Insult to Native
Women’s Injury, 3 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 1, 15 (2013) (illustrating how federal
prosecution of sexual assaults on some remote reservations is impossible, “given the short
timeframes for properly using a ‘rape kit’”); Shefali Singh, Note, Closing the Gap of Justice:
Providing Protection for Native American Women Through the Special Domestic Violence Criminal
Jurisdiction Provision of VAWA, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 210 (2014) (reporting how,
because of limited resources, the federal government regularly declines to prosecute crimes of
violence that occur in Indian country).
8 See generally Singh, supra note 7, at 209-10 (describing the jurisdictional gap in enforcement).
Non-Indian offenders commit most of the domestic violence offenses committed against Indian
victims. S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 (2012); see also AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE
FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 4
(2007), http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/MazeOfInjustice.pdf [http://perma.cc/5HYF-GXH8]
(“According to the US Department of Justice, in at least 86 per cent of reported cases of rape or
sexual assault against American Indian and Alaska Native women, survivors report that the
perpetrators are non-Native men.”); STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’ T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 203097,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002, at v (2004),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf [http://perma.cc/9NC2-5EPR] (“Approximately
60% of American Indian victims of violence . . . described the offender as white.”); Dreveskracht,
supra note 7, at 14 (“Non-Indians commit over eighty percent of the rapes and sexual assaults
against Indian women.”); Troy A. Eid, Making Native America Safer and More Just for All
Americans, 40 A.B.A. HUM. RTS., no. 4, 2014, at 7, 9 (“[N]on-Native men commit a
disproportionate number of domestic violence acts against Native women.”).
Due to insufficient law enforcement funding, infrequent prosecution of non-Indian defendants
remained the norm even in states that had criminal jurisdiction over Indian country under Public
Law 280. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra, at 29, (noting that in Public Law 280 states, “tribal and
state authorities have not received sufficient funds to assume their respective law enforcement
responsibilities”); Singh, supra note 7, at 209-10 (“Lack of funding and numerous other factors
have contributed to the reality that state and local law enforcement agencies in Indian country
acting under P.L. 280 criminal jurisdiction have generally provided unsatisfactory service and
ineffective crime control.”).
9 U.S. GOV’T A CCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-167R, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS 9 (2010),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11167r.pdf [http://perma.cc/JB9N-XXMN].
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Enter VAWA 2013 and special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction
for Indian tribes. Recognizing that “much of the violence against Indian
women is perpetrated by non-Indian men” who “regularly go unpunished,”
Congress intended special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction to fill the
prosecutorial enforcement gap for domestic violence offenses.10 Codified at
13 U.S.C. § 1304, the new provisions recognize tribes’ “inherent power . . .
to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all
persons”11—including non-Indians.
Although tribes and their advocates have celebrated VAWA 2013’s
partial override of the Oliphant decision,12 special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction has yet to withstand constitutional scrutiny at the Supreme
Court. In the debates before VAWA 2013’s passage, tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians sparked controversy because legislators and commentators
understood that non-Indian defendants prosecuted and tried in tribal court
would not receive the full protection of the federal Constitution.13 This
10 S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9. The legislation came after years of advocacy from tribes,
domestic violence survivors, and their allies. Tribal voices used- many means, including the arts,
to call attention to the pervasive problems in Indian country. For instance, a play titled Sliver of a
Full Moon narrates the stories of Indian domestic violence survivors and their fight to obtain the
VAWA 2013 provisions that created special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. See SLIVER
OF A FULL MOON, http://www.sliverofafullmoon.org, [http://perma.cc/C7ZX-WDG6] (last
visited Sept. 19, 2015).
11 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. 2013).
12 See, e.g., Lorelai Laird, Indian Tribes Are Retaking Jurisdiction over Domestic Violence on Their
Own Land, ABA J. (Apr. 1, 2015, 6:02 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/ article/
indian_tribes_are_retaking_jurisdiction_over_domestic_violence_on_their_own [perma.cc/DS5NLTKJ] (“[M]any Indian legal observers see Section 904 [the special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction provisions] as a major step toward safer reservations and, perhaps, full tribal criminal
jurisdiction.”).
13 See S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 48-49 (Minority Views from Sens. Kyl, Hatch, Sessions, and
Coburn) (arguing against tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians because non-Indians “would enjoy
few meaningful civil-rights protections” and “the absence of separation of powers and an
independent judiciary in most tribal governments makes them an unsuitable vehicle for ensuring
the protection of civil rights”); Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Joseph Lupino-Esposito, The Violence Against
Women Act, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, and Indian Tribal Courts, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 8-9, 17-39
(2012) (arguing that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants would raise questions under
Articles II and III of the federal Constitution); Jennifer Bendery, Chuck Grassley on VAWA: Tribal
Provision Means ‘The Non-Indian Doesn’t Get a Fair Trial,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:33
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/21/chuck-grassley-vawa_n_2735080.html [http://
perma.cc/5GWS-F3Y3] (commenting on remarks made by Senator Chuck Grassley, who expressed
concern that allowing tribal court juries to try non-Indians may violate non-Indians’ federal
constitutional rights to a jury trial and to the equal protection of the law); see also Laird, supra note 12
(reporting on the controversy surrounding special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction and VAWA
2013’s passage). But see Letter from Kevin Washburn, Dean and Professor of Law, University of New
Mexico School of Law, et al. to Sen. Patrick Leahy et al., Constitutionality of Tribal Government
Provisions in VAWA Reauthorization (Apr. 21, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/vawa-
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constitutional question—whether the Constitution applies in full force in
prosecutions brought under special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction—turns on whether the expanded tribal jurisdiction is an
exercise of “inherent” tribal sovereignty or delegated federal authority. If
the new jurisdiction is an exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty, then tribes
are not obligated to provide non-Indian defendants with the full protection
of the federal Constitution. But if the new jurisdiction is delegated federal
authority, then non-Indian defendants would be entitled to the full panoply
of rights under the federal Constitution—including, potentially, the right to
an Article III judge appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate under Article II of the Constitution. The bounds of inherent tribal
sovereignty could thus determine whether special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction lives or dies.14
This Comment begins in Part I by outlining the history of tribal
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, with a focus on the law most
relevant to analyzing the bounds of tribes’ inherent sovereignty to
adjudicate crimes over non-Indians. Part II explains VAWA 2013’s special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction in more detail and summarizes how
it has been implemented since the statute’s enactment. Part III discusses the
arguments for and against finding that tribes have inherent tribal
sovereignty to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, and
why the outcome matters for both tribes and non-Indian defendants. Part
letter-from-law-professors-tribal-provisions.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ZTS-2W5P] (arguing for special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction’s passage and defending its constitutionality).
Special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction in Alaska was particularly contentious—so
much so that VAWA 2013 included a statutory exemption for the state of Alaska. See Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, § 910, 127 Stat. 54, 126 (Mar. 7, 2013)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2265 note (Supp. 2013)) (“In the State of Alaska, the amendments made
by sections 904 and 905 shall only apply to the Indian country . . . of the Metlakatla Indian
Community, Annette Island Reserve.”). Tremendous disfavor toward the “Alaska exemption”
prompted its repeal in December 2014. See Act of Dec. 18, 2014, Pub. L. 113-275, 128 Stat. 2988,
2988 (repealing section 910 of VAWA 2013); Troy A. Eid & Affie Ellis, Indian Law and Order
Commission Proposals Gain Ground, FED. LAW., June 2015, at 17, 17-18 (discussing the reforms that
made federal officials more accountable to Alaska Indian communities); Sari Horwitz, Senator Tries to
Repeal Divisive Provision She Inserted in Violence Against Women Act, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/senator-tries-to-repeal-divisive-provisionshe-inserted-in-violence-against-women-act/2014/08/02/c918f854-05ef-11e4-8a6a-19355c7e870a_story
.html [http://perma.cc/3S79-KT7P] (reporting on the desperate need for greater tribal law
enforcement in Alaska, which spurred the repeal of the Alaska exemption).
14 See infra Section III.A for a more detailed discussion of this analysis. Part IV takes up a
similar but related issue—the bounds of congressional power to legislate inherent tribal sovereignty
that denies non-Indian defendants federal constitutional rights. Both analytical routes could
support or dismantle special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction as envisioned by Congress.
See infra Part V.
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IV takes an aside to note the lurking influence of the congressional plenary
power doctrine, which gives Congress broad authority to legislate in the
realm of Indian affairs. And Part V outlines how courts’ ultimate rulings
(and their underlying reasoning) would affect special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction’s future. The Conclusion addresses the underlying
questions: What are the bounds of tribes’ inherent sovereignty? From what
does that sovereignty derive? The answer will affect not just special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction under VAWA 2013, but also possible
future expansions of tribal criminal jurisdiction by Congress.
I. TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
A. Historical Origins
When analyzing the bounds of inherent tribal sovereignty, the Supreme
Court often begins by looking to the earliest records of tribal–federal
relations. 15 The earliest federal treaties with Indian tribes do address
whether tribes could prosecute and punish non-Indian criminal offenders—
but without clearly answering whether, absent a treaty, a tribe’s inherent
sovereign authority would have included these powers.
The first ratified treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe
was the 1778 Treaty with the Delawares.16 The treaty forbade both the
United States and the tribe from inflicting “punishments on the citizens of
the other” until “a fair and impartial trial” was held before judges or juries
of both the United States and the tribe.17 Under the treaty, therefore, the
Delawares lacked the independent jurisdiction to prosecute and punish nonIndians who were citizens of the United States.
Later treaties went further and declined to give tribes any power to
prosecute or punish United States citizens who “commit[ted] a robbery or

15 See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688-92 (1990) (examining historical sources and how
they bear on whether tribes may prosecute nonmember Indian defendants), superseded by statute,
Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, sec. 8077(b)–(c), § 201(2), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4) (2012)), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193
(2004); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 192-93, 195-206 (1978) (same, for nonIndian defendants).
16 Treaty with the Delawares, U.S.–Del., Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13; see Robert N. Clinton,
There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 118 (2002)
(identifying the Treaty with the Delawares as “the nation’s first ratified treaty with an Indian
tribe”).
17 Treaty with the Delawares, supra note 16, art. IV, 7 Stat. at 14.
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murder, or other capital crime, on any Indian.” 18 Instead, the treaties
allowed punishment and prosecution of non-Indians under only federal law
and using only federal procedure, to the exclusion of any tribal justice
system.19 And these later treaties did not even permit the tribes to prosecute
and punish Indian offenders who committed crimes against United States
citizens; rather, the treaties obliged the tribes to extradite Indian offenders
to the United States for punishment by a federal tribunal.20
But these treaty provisions do not necessarily stand for the notion that,
historically, tribes’ inherent sovereignty did not include the power to
prosecute and punish non-Indians. One could interpret the treaties as either
(1) codifying then-current understanding of inherent tribal sovereignty, or
(2) restricting aspects of the then-current understanding of the tribe’s
inherent sovereignty.21 In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme
Court took the first view: “From the earliest treaties with these tribes, it
was apparently assumed that the tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction
18 Treaty with the Chickasaws, U.S.–Chickasaw Nation, Jan. 10, 1786, art. VI, 7 Stat. 24, 25;
Treaty with the Choctaws, U.S.–Choctaw Nation, Jan. 3, 1786, art. VI, 7 Stat. 21, 22; Treaty with
the Cherokees, U.S.–Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, art. VII, 7 Stat. 18, 19.
19 See, e.g., Treaty with the Creeks, U.S.–Creek Nation, Aug. 7, 1790, art. IX, 7 Stat. 35, 37;
Treaty with the Indian Nations in the Northern Department and with the Wiandot, Delaware,
Ottawa, Chippewa, Pattawatima and Sac Nations, Jan. 9, 1789, art. V, 7 Stat. 28, 29 [hereinafter
Treaty with the Indian Nations]; id. at “Separate Article,” 7 Stat. 32; Treaty with the Shawnees,
U.S.–Shawanoe Nation, Jan. 31, 1786, art. III, 7 Stat. 26, 26; Treaty with the Chickasaws, supra
note 18, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 25; Treaty with the Choctaws, supra note 18, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 22; Treaty
with the Cherokees, supra note 18, art. VII, 7 Stat. at 19. One treaty also contemplated exclusive
federal civil jurisdiction over Indians pressing claims against United States citizens for stolen
horses. Treaty with the Indian Nations, supra, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 29-30; id. at “Separate Article,” 7
Stat. at 32.
20 Treaty with the Creeks, supra note 19, art. VIII, 7 Stat. at 37; Treaty with the Indian
Nations, supra note 19, art. V, 7 Stat. at 29; id. at “Separate Article,” 7 Stat. at 32; Treaty with the
Shawnees, supra note 19, art. III, 7 Stat. at 26; Treaty with the Chickasaws, supra note 18, art. V, 7
Stat. at 25; Treaty with the Choctaws, supra note 18, art. V, 7 Stat. at 22; Treaty with the
Cherokees, supra note 18, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 19; Treaty with the Wiandot, Delaware, Chippawa, and
Ottawa Nations, Jan. 21, 1785, art. IX, 7 Stat. 16, 17.
21 In the public international law context, commentators have disagreed over whether a treaty
(1) can merely codify preexisting rules governing relations between different sovereigns or
(2) must inevitably change those rules even as it attempts only to write them down. Compare
GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND
PERSPECTIVES 72 (2012) (“Besides crystallizing a custom and influencing subsequent
crystallization, a treaty may ‘codify’ pre-existing custom, giving it a definite wording.”), with R.Y.
Jennings, The Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification, 24 BRITISH Y.B.
INT’L L. 301, 304-05 (1947) (noting that “so-called declaratory treaties,” which purport to codify
existing customary international law, are in tension with the axiom that a treaty binds only those
states that are parties to it, because third-party states are bound by customary international law
even if this law is given written expression in a treaty to which these states are not party).
However, situating the interpretation of federal–tribal treaties within this debate exceeds the
scope of this Comment.
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over non-Indians absent a congressional statute or treaty provision to that
effect.”22 The second view, however, is equally plausible. Professor Robert
Clinton has criticized the Oliphant view for being “revisionist”23—a charge
that gains support from some other early treaty provisions, which dealt with
non-Indian settlers on tribal lands.
Seven of the eight earliest recorded treaties included language
disclaiming federal protection over non-Indian settlers on tribal lands.24 Six
of those seven treaties further declared that the tribes could punish those
non-Indian violators as they wished.25 In contrast to the treaty provisions
about common law crimes, these land-related provisions did contemplate
tribal jurisdiction to punish non-Indians. Although Oliphant dismisses these
provisions as simply “a means of discouraging non-Indian settlements on
Indian territory,” 26 they could equally be viewed as recognizing tribes’
inherent sovereign authority to punish all unwelcome trespassers on their
lands.27 As Professor Clinton has commented, Oliphant appears to swat away
the land-related treaty provisions to achieve the result the Court wanted: a
historical narrative that denied inherent tribal authority to prosecute and
punish non-Indians.28
All in all, the early treaties are inconclusive data. Advocates and judges
can use them both to support and to deny the notion that early conceptions
of inherent tribal sovereignty included tribal authority to prosecute and
punish non-Indians. Someone looking to early treaties to reveal the bounds
of “ancient inherent tribal power”29 will be disappointed.

22 435 U.S. 191, 197 (1978); see also id. at 197-99 n.8 (concluding that the early treaties and
their provisions “were not necessary to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians from the
Indian tribes,” but rather “clarif[ied] jurisdictional limits of the Indian tribes”).
23 Clinton, supra note 16, at 215.
24 Treaty with the Creeks, supra note 19, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 36; Treaty with the Indian Nations,
supra note 19, art. V, 7 Stat. at 30; Treaty with the Shawnees, supra note 19, art. VII, 7 Stat. at 27;
Treaty with the Chickasaws, supra note 18, art. IV, 7 Stat. at 25; Treaty with the Choctaws, supra
note 18, art. IV, 7 Stat. at 22; Treaty with the Cherokees, supra note 18, art. V, 7 Stat. at 19; Treaty
with the Wiandot, Delaware, Chippawa, and Ottawa Nations, supra note 20, art. V, 7 Stat. at 17.
25 Treaty with the Creeks, supra note 19, art. VI, 7 Stat. at 6; Treaty with the Indian Nations,
supra note 19, art. IX, 7 Stat. at 30; Treaty with the Chickasaws, supra note 18, art. IV, 7 Stat. at 25;
Treaty with the Choctaws, supra note 18, art. IV, 7 Stat. at 22; Treaty with the Cherokees, supra
note 18, art. V, 7 Stat. at 19; Treaty with the Wiandot, Delaware, Chippawa, and Ottawa Nations,
supra note 20, art. V, 7 Stat. at 17.
26 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 198 n.8.
27 See Clinton, supra note 16, at 122 (emphasizing how the early treaties recognized the
“complete territorial sovereignty of Indian tribes” over tribal lands).
28 See id. at 214 (“[T]o solidify its historical point, the Court was forced to marginalize early
treaties that expressly provided that Indian tribes could punish illegal white settlers.”).
29 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 211 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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B. Oliphant: No Jurisdiction over Non-Indians
In 1978, the Supreme Court decisively answered the question of whether
tribes have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. And the
answer was “no.”
The Supreme Court case Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe grew out of
the Suquamish tribe’s prosecutions of two non-Indian residents of the Port
Madison Reservation.30 One was charged with assaulting a tribal officer and
resisting arrest; the other, with “recklessly endangering another person” and
injuring tribal property after an alleged high-speed race on reservation
highways.31 The two defendants sought habeas relief and argued that the
tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians such as themselves.32
Although the lower courts rejected their arguments, the Supreme Court
ruled for the non-Indian defendants and held that the tribe did indeed lack
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.33
The Court’s opinion began by looking to historical precedents, which it
concluded did not support tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.34 It
next gave “considerable weight” to “the commonly shared presumption of
Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that tribal courts
do not have the power to try non-Indians.”35 But the core of the Court’s
reasoning flowed from its view of tribes’ powers as “constrained” by
“incorporation into the territory of the United States . . . so as not to
conflict with the . . . overriding sovereignty” of the federal government.36
The tribes’ subordinate status meant not only limitations on land transfers
and foreign relations powers, but also limitations on “their power to try
non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to
Congress.”37 Despite recognizing tribal courts’ increased sophistication, the
procedural rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
(ICRA), and the prevalence of non-Indian crime on reservations, the Court
maintained that the tribes lacked inherent jurisdiction to try and punish

30 435 U.S. at 194. Although under an 1855 treaty the Suquamish were Port Madison
Reservation’s designated occupants, by the 1970s only thirty-seven percent of the reservation was
Indian-owned and only fifty tribe members lived on the reservation. Id. at 192-93 & 192 n.1.
31 Id. at 194.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 194-95.
34 Id. at 195-206; see also supra Section I.A (discussing the Court’s one-sided interpretation of
early treaties).
35 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206.
36 Id. at 209.
37 Id. at 209-10.
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non-Indians.38 The countervailing considerations were waved aside: they
were matters for Congress, not the Court, to weigh.39
C. Duro, the Duro Fix, and Lara: Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians
Until VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction,
Oliphant was the rule for tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. But
on the issue of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, the last
three decades saw a significant dialogue between Congress and the Court—
a dialogue that may preface the coming debate over the extent to which
Oliphant endures, post–VAWA 2013.
In May 1990, the Supreme Court held in Duro v. Reina that tribes lacked
criminal jurisdiction over Indians who were not members of the respective
prosecuting tribes. 40 Because the historical argument for denying
jurisdiction was weaker here than in Oliphant, 41 the Court rested its
conclusion in large part on the principle that a tribe’s authority should
derive “from the consent of its members.”42 Given that tribal courts did not
provide nonmember defendants with the full guarantees of the federal
Constitution, the Court held that a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over its
members was justified by “the voluntary character of tribal membership,” but
that the tribes’ criminal jurisdiction could not extend to nonmembers, who by
definition had not given voluntary consent.43 As the Court had done in
Oliphant, the Duro Court emphasized that Congress—not the Court—
should solve insufficient criminal-law enforcement problems on Indian
lands.44
Congress’s response was swift. In November of that same year,
Congress passed legislation that overruled Duro’s holding and granted tribes
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute nonmember Indians.45 The key statutory
change was a new provision that defined “Indian” for purposes of tribal
38
39
40

Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 212.
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-511, sec. 8077(b)–(c), § 201(2), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4)
(2012)), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
41 See id. at 688-91 (noting that “[t]he historical record in this case is somewhat less
illuminating than in Oliphant” and that “[e]vidence on criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is
less clear,” but nonetheless concluding that the evidence “on balance supports the view that
inherent tribal jurisdiction extends to tribe members only”).
42 Id. at 693.
43 Id. at 693-94.
44 Id. at 698.
45 See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, sec. 8077(b)–(c), § 201(2), 104 Stat. 1856,
1892-93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4) (2012)).
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criminal jurisdiction as “any person” who would be subject to federal
criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.46
Under United States v. Rogers, this definition of “Indian” includes persons
with (1) some Indian blood, who are (2) associated with a federally
recognized tribe—but it contains no restriction on the specific tribe with
which an Indian is associated.47 The new statute therefore extended tribal
criminal jurisdiction to all “Indians”—including nonmember Indians.
Congress also clearly stated that tribal criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians flowed from “the inherent power of Indian tribes,
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians.”48 This inherent-power provision communicated Congress’s direct
disagreement with the Supreme Court’s view that inherent tribal authority
did not include the power to punish nonmembers in tribal court.49
When Congress’s “Duro fix”50 came to the Supreme Court for review in
2004, the Court upheld it in the face of a double jeopardy challenge brought
by a nonmember Indian.51 In United States v. Lara, the Court declared that
“Congress has the constitutional power to relax restrictions that the political
branches have, over time, placed on the exercise of a tribe’s inherent legal
authority.”52
The Court did not just affirm Congress’s ability to enact the Duro fix; it
also overruled Duro by endorsing the notion that tribal criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians flowed from tribes’ inherent sovereignty.53 The
Court’s inherent-sovereignty justification was key to defeating the defendant’s
double jeopardy claim: his claim depended on his initial tribal prosecution
being an exercise of delegated federal authority, so that his subsequent
46
47

Id. sec. 8077(c), § 201(4), 104 Stat. at 1892-93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(4) (2012)).
United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846) (holding that, for federal
criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, a man without Indian blood who was adopted
into a tribe “is not an Indian” and thus could not receive the exception from federal criminal
jurisdiction for Indian-on-Indian crimes); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
supra note 6, § 3.03[4] (“The common test that has evolved after United States v. Rogers, for use
with both of the federal Indian country criminal statutes, considers Indian descent, as well as
recognition as an Indian by a federally recognized tribe.”).
48 Act of Nov. 5, 1990, sec. 8077(b), § 201(2), 104 Stat. at 1892 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2012)).
49 Cf. Duro, 495 U.S. at 694 (“[N]o delegation of authority to a tribe has to date included the
power to punish nonmembers in tribal court. We decline to produce such a result through
recognition of inherent tribal authority.”).
50 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(using the term).
51 Id. at 196-99 (majority opinion). See gemerally U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
52 Id. at 196.
53 Id. at 199.
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federal prosecution would be an impermissible second prosecution brought
under federal auspices.54 But because the tribal prosecution was an exercise
of inherent tribal authority rather than of federal power, and because the
Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause “does not bar successive prosecutions
by separate sovereigns,” the Court rejected the defendant’s double jeopardy
claim.55
The Duro–Duro fix–Lara dialogue between Congress and the Court was
about tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. For tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, we have the two first steps of an
analogous dialogue: Oliphant,56 followed by VAWA 2013’s special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction.57 What is left—and what tribal observers are
waiting for58—is the final step. Will the Supreme Court mimic its approach
in Lara if special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction comes before the
Court for review?

54
55

Id. at 196-99.
Id. at 197, 210. The Court also rejected the defendant’s due process claim on similar
grounds. Id. at 207-09.
56 See generally supra Section I.B.
57 See generally supra notes 3–14 and accompanying text. Part II, infra, discusses in more detail
how VAWA 2013 partially overrides Oliphant.
58 See Laird, supra note 12 (noting how tribes are “very aware” of a possible legal challenge
and have even encouraged defendants to appeal in hope that a tribe-friendly vehicle will reach the
Court for review).
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Table 1: Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction

Over Nonmember
Indians

Over Non-Indians

Initial Supreme Court
Ruling

Tribes lack
jurisdiction, because
they lack nonmember
Indians’ voluntary
consent.
–Duro, 199059

Congressional Reply

Tribes have
jurisdiction because of
their inherent power.
–Duro fix, 199061

Tribes lack
jurisdiction, because
the federal
government’s
overriding sovereignty
constrains them.
–Oliphant, 197860
Tribes have
jurisdiction because of
their inherent power.
–VAWA 201362

Supre me C ourt
Response:
Ruling on the
Constitutionality of the
Congressional Reply

Tribes’ jurisdiction is
To be determined
constitutional because
of tribes’ inherent
sovereignty.
–Lara, 200363

II. SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION UNDER
VAWA 2013
A. Narrowly Expanded Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indian
Defendants
Before examining how and why the Supreme Court might rule,64 it is
worth examining the nuanced choices Congress made when enacting special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. While the Duro fix was a general
override of the Supreme Court’s holding in Duro, special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction overrides Oliphant only partially: It applies only to
59
60
61
62
63
64

See generally supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
See generally supra Section I.B.
See generally supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.
See generally supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See generally supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
See infra Parts III–IV.
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certain acts involving certain people committed on certain territory. And it
also applies only when accompanied by appropriate safeguards to protect
defendants’ rights.
VAWA 2013 defines special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction as
“criminal jurisdiction that a participating tribe may exercise under [VAWA
2013] but could not otherwise exercise.”65 A participating tribe is “an Indian
tribe that elects to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction
over the Indian country of that tribe.”66 Under the statute, “Indian country”
has the same definition as the one used for the Major Crimes Act in 18
U.S.C. § 1153, and it covers reservation land, dependent Indian
communities, and Indian allotments. 67 Thus, special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction is territorially limited.
The statute also limits special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction
based on defendants’ and victims’ personal attributes. Either the defendant
or the victim must be Indian; 68 special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction is not allowed if neither is Indian.69 A victim may be Indian or
non-Indian, so long as he or she is “specifically protected by a protection
order that the defendant allegedly violated.”70 As for the defendant, he or
she must have ties to the prosecuting Indian tribe: the defendant must
(1) reside in the tribe’s Indian country, (2) be employed in the tribe’s
Indian country, or (3) be the spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of a
member of the tribe or an Indian who resides in the tribe’s Indian country.71
Special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction also has subject-matter
limitations. A tribe may prosecute only acts of dating violence, acts of
domestic violence, and violations of protective orders. 72 The new
jurisdiction does not, therefore, cover stranger rape or other assaults where
the victim has no prior “social relationship of a romantic or intimate
nature”73 with the defendant.74

65
66
67

25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(6) (Supp. 2013).
Id. § 1304(a)(4).
See id. § 1304(a)(3) (giving “Indian country” the meaning given in 18 U.S.C. § 1151); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (listing the three “Indian country” categories). See generally COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6, § 3.04[2][c] (providing more context and
background about the three categories).
68 “Indian” is not defined in the statute. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a). Courts will likely apply the
definition of Indian developed in United States v. Rogers and its progeny. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
69 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2013).
70 Id. § 1304(b)(4)(A)(ii).
71 Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B).
72 Id. § 1304(c) (Supp. 2013).
73 Id. § 1304(a)(1).
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Last but not least, Congress expressly required prosecuting tribes to
provide defendants with particular individual rights:
•

•
•

•

for defendants at risk of imprisonment, all the rights of defendants
guaranteed in the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §
1302(c), which include
o “the effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that
guaranteed by the United States Constitution,”
o “a defense attorney licensed to practice law,”
o a judge who is licensed to practice law and “has sufficient
legal training to preside over criminal prosecutions,”
o publicly available criminal laws, rules of evidence, and rules
of criminal procedure, and
o a record of the criminal proceeding;75
an impartial jury that “reflect[s] a fair cross section of the community”
and does not discriminate against non-Indians;
“all other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution
of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the
inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant”; and
the right to seek habeas relief in federal court.76

Apart from the VAWA 2013 statute, defendants must also receive other
constitutional rights guaranteed by ICRA:
•
•
•
•

the right “against unreasonable searches and seizures,” so that
probable cause is required before a search or seizure,
the right against double jeopardy,
the right against self-incrimination,
the right to a speedy and public trial,

74 As defined in the statute, “dating violence” requires at least a “social relationship of a
romantic or intimate nature” to qualify as subject matter that tribes may prosecute. Id. “Domestic
violence” requires even more from the prior relationship: domestic violence is defined under the
statute as “violence committed by a current or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim, by
a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or
has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner, or by a person similarly situated to
a spouse of the victim.” Id. § 1304(a)(2). Violations of protective orders require the victim to have
had a prior relationship with the defendant that was sufficient to obtain the requisite “injunction,
restraining order, or other order issued by a civil or criminal court for the purpose of preventing
violent or threatening acts or harassment against, sexual violence against, contact or
communication with, or physical proximity to, [the victim].” Id. § 1304(a)(5).
75 Id. § 1302(c) (2012).
76 Id. § 1304(d), (e) (Supp. 2013).
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the right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him” and to
subpoena friendly witnesses,
the right against excessive bail, excessive fines, and “cruel and unusual
punishments,”
the right against bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, and
the right to a trial by a jury of at least six persons.77

Congress passed VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction with all these territorial, personal, subject-matter, and rightsbased limitations. And, as with tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians
in the Duro fix, Congress intended special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction to flow from inherent tribal sovereignty: “The powers of selfgovernment of a participating tribe include the inherent power of that tribe,
which is hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction over all persons.”78
Given Congress’s view that tribes act as independent sovereigns when
exercising special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the statute also
allows for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes
in Indian country.79 The statute thus contemplates that states exercising
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country under Public Law 28080 may still do
so.81 And if the federal government prosecutes a defendant for the same
77 Id. § 1302(a). A defendant may invoke the rights listed in § 1302(a) against any “Indian
tribe exercising powers of self-government.” Id. “Powers of self-government” are defined to
include “the inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”
Id. § 1301(2) (2012) (emphasis added). VAWA 2013 added that, “in addition to all powers of selfgovernment recognized and affirmed by section[] 1301 . . . , the powers of self-government of a
participating tribe include the inherent power of that tribe . . . to exercise special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.” Id. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. 2013) (emphasis added); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 58 (2012) (noting that ICRA would apply in prosecutions brought
under special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction).
78 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (emphasis added).
79 Id. § 1304(b)(2).
80 See supra note 6 for a discussion of Public Law 280 and how it confers criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country to select states.
81 Even if special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction is found to be a tribal exercise of
delegated federal authority, a state prosecution brought before or after a tribal prosecution for the
same crime would not present a double jeopardy problem. Federal and state authorities may bring
separate prosecutions for the same conduct, because the federal and state governments are separate
sovereigns. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 193-95 (1959) (declining to overrule the
separate-sovereigns principle); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-23 (1959) (rejecting the
defendant’s double jeopardy claim when “[t]he state and federal prosecutions were separately
conducted”); Orin Kerr, Cert Petition Asks Court to Overturn “Dual Sovereignty” Doctrine in Double
Jeopardy Law, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 13, 2013, 3:29 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/06/13/certpetition-asks-court-to-overturn-dual-sovereignty-doctrine-in-double-jeopardy-law [http://perma.cc/
DAJ5-26PQ] (“Despite its text, the Double Jeopardy clause has been interpreted by the Supreme
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crime before or after a tribal prosecution under VAWA 2013’s special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the statute implies that a double
jeopardy challenge to either prosecution would not succeed—the “separate
sovereigns” doctrine would allow both prosecutions to go on.82
B. Pilot Projects
Although special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction took effect
nationwide on March 7, 2015, VAWA 2013 authorized “pilot projects”
whereby select tribes could commence exercising the jurisdiction on an
accelerated basis before the nationwide start date, so long as the pilot
project tribes had demonstrated to the Attorney General and Secretary of
the Interior that they had “adequate safeguards in place to protect
defendants’ rights.”83 Five tribal pilot project applications were approved
prior to March 7, 2015: those of the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the
Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana, of the Confederated Tribes of
the Umatilla Indian Reservation in Oregon, of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of
Arizona, of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation
in South Dakota, and of the Tulalip Tribes of Washington.84
The Pascua Yaqui Tribe was among the first to bring prosecutions. By
April 2014, the Pascua Yaqui had already arrested and charged three
defendants.85 By June 2014, the number had increased to twelve.86 And by
Court to allow both the federal government and a state government to bring charges for the same
conduct because they are separate sovereigns.”). A recent petition for certiorari asked the Court to
revisit the dual-sovereignty doctrine, but the Court declined to do so. See Roach v. Missouri, 134
S. Ct. 118 (2013) (denying the petition for certiorari); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Roach,
134 S. Ct. 118 (No. 12-1394) (“The question presented is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
a state prosecution for a criminal offense when the defendant has previously been convicted of the
same offense in federal court.”).
82 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
83 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 908(2), 127
Stat. 54, 125-26 (Mar. 7, 2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 note on effective dates and pilot
project (Supp. 2013)).
84 VAWA 2013 Pilot Project, U.S. DEP’T J UST., http://www.justice.gov/tribal/vawa-2013pilot-project [http://perma.cc/XF5B-HSJ2] (last updated Mar. 13, 2015).
85 See Sari Horwitz, Arizona Tribe Set to Prosecute First Non-Indian Under a New Law, WASH.
POST (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/arizona-tribe-set-to-prosecutefirst-non-indian-under-a-new-law/2014/04/18/127a202a-bf20-11e3-bcecb71ee10e9bc3_story.html[http://perma.cc/6FTS-STTW] (noting the then-pending cases against
defendants Eloy Figueroa Lopez, Tony R. Slaton, and Myxay Yongbanthom); Steve Straeley,
First Trial of a Non-Native American in a Tribal Court, ALLGOV (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://www.allgov.com/news/ controversies/first-trial-of-a-non-native-american-in-a-tribal-court140421?news=852965 [http://perma.cc/EA48-7ZP2] (discussing Lopez’s case).
86 See Jacelle Ramon-Sauberan, VAWA Already Improving Life for the Pascqua Yaqui Tribe,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK.COM (June 9, 2014), http://indiancountrytoday
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March 2015, it was at least sixteen.87 The tribe’s first VAWA trial took place
in November 2014 and dealt with an atypical same-sex partnership case.88 In
that closely watched trial, the defendant was acquitted because the jury
failed to find the intimate relationship required for special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction (the defendant argued that he was a
roommate, not a romantic partner).89
Other pilot project tribes had to change their laws and court procedures
before receiving pilot project approval, 90 but they too began exercising
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction prior to March 7, 2015: of the
twenty-three defendants prosecuted under special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction by March 2015, sixteen had been prosecuted by the
Pascua Yaqui, five by the Tulalip Tribes, and two by the Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation.91 Although many of the cases are
pending as of this writing, nine had already ended in plea deals.92
The implementing tribes were aware that special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction could face legal challenge, and they aimed “to
implement the law well, so that when some case comes along, it’s a good
vehicle.”93 The Umatilla Tribes even offered to waive tribal exhaustion

medianetwork.com / 2014 / 06 / 09 / vawa-already-improving-life-pascuayaqui-tribe-155209?page=0%2C1
[http://perma.cc/8MP3-2N2K] (“The tribe currently has 12 VAWA investigations that have lead
to arrests of non-Native Americans . . . .”).
87 See Laird, supra note 12 (“As of March, the three tribes [approved for pilot projects] had
prosecuted 23 defendants on a total of 38 criminal counts: 16 defendants by Pascua Yaqui, five by
Tulalip and two by Umatilla.”); Laurel Morales, Native Americans Can Prosecute Non-Natives in
Tribal Court, FRONTERAS DESK (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/9971/
native-americans-can-prosecute-non-natives-tribal-court [http://perma.cc/3GL9-NVNU] (noting
the Pascua Yaqui Attorney General’s comments about the tribe’s nineteen VAWA cases).
88 Laird, supra note 12.
89 Id.
90 See Criminal Court Directive, CONFEDERATED TRIBES UMATILLA INDIAN
RESERVATION (Jan. 22, 2014), http://ctuir.org/system/files/Criminal%20Court%20Directive%20122-24.pdf [http://perma.cc/67DZ-K6CJ] (implementing new procedural rules); Richard Peterson,
Prosecution of Non-Indians Now Under Tribal Jurisdiction, FORT PECK J. ONLINE (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://www.fortpeckjournal.net/2015/03/12/ prosecution - of - non - indians - now - under - tribal jurisdiction/#sthash.Km4DHhZT.dpbs [http://perma.cc/6QDX-29D7] (“Fort Peck had to change
parts of its code and some court procedures to give non-Indians their constitutional rights in tribal
court . . . .”). Some tribes have also organized a working group to provide “peer-to-peer” advice
and information about how best to implement special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. See
About ITWG, NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/pilot-projectitwg/about-itwg [http://perma.cc/6BQN-EDMB] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (describing the
Intertribal Technical-Assistance Working Group on Special Domestic Violence Criminal
Jurisdiction (ITWG)).
91 Laird, supra note 12.
92 Id.
93 Id. (quoting John Dossett, General Counsel of the National Congress of American Indians).
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requirements, hoping that their first defendant would bring a habeas suit,
but the defendant declined to do so.94
C. Nationwide Launch
After March 7, 2015, tribes nationwide could implement special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction without going through the pilot project
process. According to the Department of Justice in May 2015, about forty
tribes planned to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction,
and they were “gearing up to ensure that the requisite legal safeguards are
in place.”95 In June 2015, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians was preparing
to implement special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, and the tribe
had already signed a new ordinance allowing for an impartial jury. 96
Government agencies continue to support tribal efforts to begin VAWA
2013 prosecutions.97
As more tribes implement VAWA 2013, more prosecutions of nonIndian defendants are inevitable—and so are legal challenges to the
jurisdictional framework. Objections about special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction’s constitutionality have not abated.98 The next Parts
explore possible legal challenges to the jurisdictional framework, how courts
might analyze them, and how their eventual outcome could impact special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction.

94 Id. Dossett speculated that most defendants “want to get over it and get on with their
lives” and “don’t want to be the big test case.” Id. After all, thirteen years elapsed between the
Duro fix and the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold it in Lara. Id.
95 Miranda S. Spivack, Tribal Law on Domestic Violence Takes Effect, WOMEN’S ENEWS
(May 13, 2015), http://womensenews.org/story/domestic-violence/150512/tribal-law-domesticviolence-takes-effect [http://perma.cc/3KZC-4LTP].
96 See Scott McKie, Tribe Asserts DV Jurisdiction over Non-Indians, CHEROKEE ONE
FEATHER (June 16, 2015), http://theonefeather.com/2015/06/tribe-asserts-dv-jurisdiction-overnon-indians [http://perma.cc/U2TT-YT8J.
97 See, e.g., Press Release, Bureau of Indian Affairs Office of Justice Services, U.S. Dep’t of
the Interior, BIA Office of Justice Services in Conjunction With the Tulalip Tribes Will Co-Host
VAWA Tribal Trial Advocacy Skills Training in September (Aug. 26, 2015),
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc1-031537.pdf [http://perma.cc/
L96W-9AKF].
98 See, e.g., Stephen Fee et al., Tribal Justice: Prosecuting Non-Natives for Sexual Assault on
Reservations, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 5, 2015, 1:08 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/tribaljustice-prosecuting-non-natives-sexual-assault-indian-reservations [http://perma.cc/VCV6-EBLV]
(reporting on former U.S. Senator Tom Coburn’s criticisms, and quoting him as saying that “this
provision will eventually be thrown out, be challenged, and on appeal they’ll lose, because you
cannot guarantee American citizens their constitutional rights if they’re non-tribal members in a
tribal court”).
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III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INHERENT TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY TO PROSECUTE NON-INDIANS
UNDER VAWA 2013
A. Why Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Matters
When the eventual test case does come before a federal court for review,
VAWA 2013’s framework for special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction
will likely force the court to adjudicate the bounds of inherent tribal
sovereignty.99 The scope of inherent tribal sovereignty matters a great deal
for non-Indian defendants, because it determines whether the non-Indian
defendants must receive all the federal constitutional rights that they would
receive in federal or state court. If defendants’ tribal prosecutions are a
delegation of federal authority, then the defendants have a colorable legal
claim that they should receive the full panoply of federal constitutional
rights. But if the tribal prosecutions are actions of a separate sovereign, then
the federal Bill of Rights—and much of the federal Constitution—is
inapplicable. 100 The defendant would thus receive only those federal
constitutional protections codified in the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),101
and required by statute under VAWA 2013.102 The defendant would not
receive, for example, the benefit of the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury
indictment requirement.103
Thus, when federal constitutional rights not codified in ICRA or VAWA
2013 will determine the outcome of a defendant’s case, the bounds of
inherent tribal sovereignty become very important indeed. And, in practice,
the gap between (1) all federal constitutional rights and (2) defendants’
rights under ICRA and VAWA 2013 is more than just the number of rights
missing in ICRA and VAWA 2013; tribal courts interpreting ICRA rights
need not always interpret them identically to the corresponding federal
99 See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text (showing how the inherent-sovereignty
question could affect the analysis of non-Indian defendants’ constitutional challenges).
100 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 58-59 (2012) (“Non-Indians tried within the Indian Tribal government
system would not be guaranteed their full constitutional rights . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 48
(2012) (Minority Views from Sens. Kyl, Hatch, Sessions, and Coburn) (“Courts have held, for
example, that tribal governments are not bound by the Constitution’s First, Fifth, or Fourteenth
Amendments.”).
101 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2012).
102 See supra Section II.A for a list of express protections that VAWA provides to defendants.
103 See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 63 n.14 (“[Section] 1302 does not require tribal criminal
prosecutions to be initiated by grand jury indictment . . . .”).
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constitutional rights. 104 For example, some federal common law
constitutional rights, such as the right to Miranda warnings under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments,105 are not imputed into the analogous ICRA and
VAWA 2013 provisions.106 Additionally, though both ICRA and the federal
Constitution provide defendants with the right against double jeopardy, the
inherent-sovereignty question will determine whether tribal and federal
prosecutions brought consecutively would violate the federal Double
Jeopardy Clause: as shown by Lara, if tribal criminal jurisdiction derives
from inherent tribal sovereignty, then no double jeopardy problem exists.107
Figure 1 illustrates the difference between (1) federal constitutional rights
and (2) ICRA and VAWA 2013 rights.

104 See generally Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at
Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 496 (1998) (“[T]he courts routinely have ruled that the
meaning and application of the ICRA is not determined by Anglo-American constitutional
interpretations.”); id. at 513 (concluding that, in tribal courts, “cultural considerations sometimes
contribute to unique interpretations” of ICRA rights).
105 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (holding that, to protect a criminal
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, the defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires”). But see Singh, supra note 7, at 223-25 (discussing
Miranda rights and concluding that the constitutional “catch-all” provision could resolve any
constitutional defects created by Miranda and other federal common law rights).
106 The ICRA analogue to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (2012).
The VAWA 2013 analogue to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1304(d)(2) (Supp. 2013), which incorporates by reference, for defendants facing imprisonment,
rights guaranteed under ICRA to defendants facing imprisonment for longer than one year. See 25
U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012). Those rights include “the right to effective assistance of counsel at least
equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution.” Id. § 1302(c)(1). But even if the
VAWA 2013 right to counsel mirrors the federal right to counsel, the ICRA right against selfincrimination would not necessarily replicate the federal right against self-incrimination. See supra
note 102 and accompanying text. Thus, Miranda rights are not presumed to apply to tribal arrests.
107 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. The answer to the inherent-sovereignty question
would also answer the antecedent question about whether the federal Double Jeopardy Clause or
the ICRA double jeopardy provision governs the tribal prosecution. If special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction flows from inherent tribal sovereignty, then the ICRA double jeopardy
provision would apply, and consecutive tribal and federal prosecutions for the same conduct would
be permissible (so long as the tribe does not prosecute the defendant more than once for the same
conduct). But if special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction is delegated federal authority, then
the federal Double Jeopardy Clause is in play, and consecutive tribal and federal prosecutions
would violate the Clause, because both prosecutions would be federal.
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Figure 1: Inherent Tribal Sovereignty’s Significance to Defendants’ Rights

Complete Federal
Constitutional
Rights

ICRA and
VAWA 2013
Rights

Rights that Turn on Whether Special Domestic Violence Criminal
Jurisdiction Flows from Inherent Tribal Sovereignty or
Delegated Federal Authority
(e.g., the federal right against double jeopardy,
the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury,
Article II and Article III separation of powers structural guarantees,
federal constitutional rights with analogues in ICRA and VAWA 2013
that are less defendant-protective
in tribal courts than in federal courts)

Of course, to some extent, VAWA 2013’s constitutional “catch-all”
provision108 resolves the gap between (1) federal constitutional rights and
(2) ICRA and VAWA 2013 rights; it requires tribes to provide defendants
with “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution
of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the
inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.” 109 So, even if a
108
109

See Singh, supra note 7, at 225 (using the term).
25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (Supp. 2013).
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prosecution is found unconstitutional for failure to provide a defendant
with a particular right guaranteed by the federal Constitution,110 later tribal
prosecutions in other cases could solve the problem by ensuring defendants
receive rights identical to those under the federal Constitution.
But even the “catch-all” provision would not be enough to overcome
double jeopardy, Article II, or Article III concerns. United States v. Lara111 is
the obvious example of why inherent tribal sovereignty will always matter
to a defendant bringing a double jeopardy claim. If tribal prosecutions of
non-Indian defendants flow from delegated federal authority, then a tribe
could not prosecute conduct that was already the subject of a federal
prosecution, no matter how many rights the defendants would have under
tribal criminal procedure. To avoid double jeopardy problems, federal and
tribal prosecutors would have to cooperate and agree not duplicate each
other’s efforts.112
But such pragmatic solutions do not exist for the Article II and Article
III problems that might surface if a court adjudicates any federal
constitutional claim brought by a defendant and refuses to find inherent
tribal sovereignty to prosecute non-Indian defendants. As Paul Larkin, Jr.,
and Joseph Lupino-Esposito of the Heritage Foundation have argued,113
Article II requires federal judges to be appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, 114 and Article III mandates life tenure and
undiminished compensation for federal judges. 115 Larkin and LupinoEsposito opine that “[b]ecause tribal judges don’t necessarily have those
guarantees and are appointed by tribes,” they do not meet the
Constitution’s Article II and Article III requirements, and special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction is therefore impermissible as a delegation of
110 A tribal prosecution could be found unconstitutional by the tribal trial court itself, by an
appellate tribal court, or by a federal court on habeas review. ICRA guarantees federal habeas
review of tribal criminal convictions, and VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction incorporates that protection by reference. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
111 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see also supra Section I.C (discussing Lara).
112 See, e.g., OR. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OREGON D EPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CRIME
VICTIMS’ SERVICES DIVISION TRIBAL NATION LISTENING TOUR 1-2 (2013),
http://www.tribal-institute.org/2014/E11HandOut2.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4GR-L6SJ] (discussing
Oregon’s statewide VAWA implementation plan, administered with cooperation from the Oregon
Department of Justice, tribal representatives, and the U.S. Department of Justice); Ernestine
Chasing Hawk, Tribes Discuss Prosecution of Non-Indians on Tribal Lands, NAVAJO TIMES (Apr. 8,
2015), http://navajotimes.com / wires-wp / index.php?id=1595618643&kid = SmB5ZcRvalt332nL
[http://perma.cc/SF2G-CACZ] (reporting that federal prosecutors in Oregon, North Dakota, and
South Dakota met with tribal officials to discuss how to jointly implement VAWA 2013).
113 See Larkin & Lupino-Esposito, supra note 13, at 8-9, 17-39.
114 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
115 Id. art. III, § 1.
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federal authority.116 A full treatment of these issues lies beyond the scope of
this Comment, but suffice it to say that these structural defects could prove
impossible for tribes to cure.117
116 Laird, supra note 12 (paraphrasing Larkin); see also Larkin & Lupino-Esposito, supra note
13, at 8-9, 17-39.
117 If courts rule that special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction stems from delegated
federal authority rather than inherent tribal sovereignty, tribes could answer the Article III
contentions by arguing that the jurisdiction is still valid as an exercise of jurisdiction by a
congressionally sanctioned non-Article III court—i.e., an Article I court created by the legislature.
See generally 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3528 (3d ed. 2015) (examining the jurisprudence surrounding Article I legislative courts); Larkin
& Lupino-Esposito, supra note 13, at 26 (“The Supreme Court has held in several different
contexts that Congress may vest in other courts, known as ‘Article I courts,’ the authority to
adjudicate rights and responsibilities of parties to a dispute even if judges who lack life tenure and
salary protection enjoyed by Article III judges preside over those courts.”).
But the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence surrounding Article I legislative courts is not settled,
and it is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court might view a claim that tribal courts are
actually Article I legislative courts. Larkin and Lupino-Esposito argue that the Court would
invalidate tribal courts because they do not fall under the traditional categories of Article I
legislative courts upheld by the Supreme Court. Larkin & Lupino-Esposito, supra note 13, at 2639; see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2610 (2011) (following the categorical approach to
Article I courts adopted by Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50 (1982)); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64-70 (recognizing three valid categories of Article
I courts: (1) territorial courts and District of Columbia courts, (2) military courts-martial,
and (3) courts and agencies created to adjudicate “public rights”). The Supreme Court could,
however, follow a less-categorical balancing approach, like the one endorsed in CFTC v. Schor. See
478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (adopting an approach to reviewing Article III challenges that “weighed a
number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical
effect . . . on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary”). Indeed, the Court’s
recent decisions about the validity of bankruptcy courts appear to veer towards the Schor approach.
See Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942-44 (2015) (citing and discussing Schor
with approval); Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2014) (retreating in
part from Stern’s strict categorical approach); Daniel Bussel, Commentary: Wellness after Stern,
SCOTUSBLOG (May. 28, 2015, 10:19 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/05/commentarywellness-after-stern [http://perma.cc/LPF2-7NHK] (“Wellness and Arkison both eschew the
formalism of Stern and adopt functionalist perspectives to Article III to uphold pre-Stern
practices.”).
The Article II contentions, on the other hand, could prove even more difficult to surmount
than the Article III issues. Even if tribal courts are Article I legislative courts, Article II and the
Appointments Clause would apply to tribal judges exercising delegated federal authority. See
Larkin & Lupino-Esposito, supra note 13, at 20. And Article II would constrain not just tribal
judges, but also tribal prosecutors, who might—like U.S. Attorneys—likewise fall under the
Appointments Clause’s reach. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting that “the power to bring federal prosecutions, which is part of
the putative delegated power, is manifestly and quintessentially executive power” and Congress
cannot transfer it “to individuals who are beyond meaningful Presidential control” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Remedying the Article II issues might hypothetically require tribes to submit to presidential
appointment and Senate confirmation of tribal judges and prosecutors. But this course of action is
objectionable from the tribal perspective. Tribes are already concerned about “losing the features
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B. No Inherent Tribal Sovereignty to Prosecute Non-Indians: Oliphant, History,
and Political Representation Concerns
On the actual question of whether special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction flows from inherent tribal sovereignty, credible justifications
exist for both possible answers. A court adjudicating the issue will have to
choose which set of justifications it finds more persuasive.
A non-Indian defendant could begin by arguing that Oliphant’s reasoning
is still applicable, even if Congress partially overrode its holding. In other
words, even if Congress gave tribes statutory jurisdiction to try and punish
non-Indians, Indian tribes still “do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and
to punish non-Indians.”118 Further, Oliphant rested its holding on the notion
that inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was inconsistent with
tribes’ status as dependent nations,119 and there is no reason to believe that
this underlying presumption has changed. Although Oliphant did seem to
contemplate that tribes might have power “to try non-Indian citizens of the
United States . . . in a manner acceptable to Congress” (which would appear to
endorse upholding VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction),120 a non-Indian defendant could counter with the argument
that Oliphant’s dictum merely referred to statutory delegations of federal
authority—not inherent tribal authority to punish.121
Apart from Oliphant, a defendant might also argue that history does not
support inherent tribal authority to prosecute non-Indians. As discussed
above, early treaties might support the notion that tribes were not, at the
beginning of the Republic, understood to have authority to prosecute nonIndians (though, of course, the early treaties might also support the opposite
of their own justice traditions” through VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction. Laird, supra note 12; see also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation
that Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 801 (1993)
(noting how applying even the Bill of Rights to tribal prosecutions “would seriously interfere with
tribal culture and the values incorporated in tribal laws”). Imposing additional federal oversight
would only exacerbate these concerns.
118 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (emphasis added).
119 Id. at 206-11; see also supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (discussing Oliphant’s holding).
120 Oliphant, 436 U.S. at 210.
121 Post-Oliphant, the Supreme Court has affirmed that “[i]n the main . . . the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe—those powers a tribe enjoys apart from express provision by treaty or
statute—do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
520 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1997) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). These precedents, however, came before the 2004 Lara decision, which
upheld Congress’s decision to extend tribes’ inherent sovereign powers to nonmembers (specifically,
nonmember Indians). See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004). Thus, allusions to Strate
and Montana would have limited weight in a challenge to VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction.
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proposition as well).122 A defendant could also point to ICRA, which did not
include criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in its recognition of tribes’
“inherent power,” even after the Duro fix.123 However, the Duro fix to ICRA,
enacted twenty-five years ago in 1990,124 could simply reflect Congress’s
choice to “relax restrictions”125 on inherent tribal sovereignty to a lesser extent
at that time; Congress might have intended to further relax former
restrictions by enacting special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. To
this, a defendant could argue that, Congress still cannot give tribes more
inherent sovereignty than they ever possessed before. The defendant could
then cite early treaties and the like to support the underlying assumption that
tribes’ inherent sovereignty never included criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians. In Justice Kennedy’s words, “[i]t is a most troubling proposition to
say that Congress can relax the restrictions on inherent tribal sovereignty in a
way that extends that sovereignty beyond . . . historical limits.”126
From a policy perspective, a defendant arguing against inherent tribal
sovereignty can continue to echo Justice Kennedy by citing political
representation concerns, which Justice Kennedy raised in both his Lara
concurrence and his opinion for the Court in Duro. In Lara, he opined that
subjecting a defendant “to a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the
Constitution” violates the basic constitutional theory of “original, and
continuing, consent of the governed.”127 Though a given tribe’s members
consent to that tribe’s extraconstitutional sovereignty, nonmember
Indians—and certainly non-Indians—do not. 128 Hence, in Duro, Justice
Kennedy wrote for the Court that “in the criminal sphere membership marks
the bounds of tribal authority.”129 And even if non-Indians have consented to
Congress’s ability (as the federal legislature) to act in the field of Indian
affairs, a defendant could argue that there are “constitutional limitations
even on the ability of Congress to subject American citizens to criminal

122
123

See supra Section I.A.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012) (“‘[P]owers of self-government’ means . . . the inherent
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (discussing how
the Duro fix codified the statutory bounds of tribal criminal jurisdiction so that it would reach
nonmember Indians, but not non-Indians).
124 See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, sec. 8077(b)–(c), § 201(2), 104 Stat. 1856,
1892-93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4)).
125 Lara, 541 U.S. at 196.
126 Id. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 5, 1990,
§ 8077(b)–(c), 104 Stat. at 1892-93, as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 193.
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proceedings before a tribunal that does not provide constitutional
protections as a matter of right.”130
C. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty to Prosecute Non-Indians: History, Lara,
the Executive Branch, and Public Policy
To support inherent tribal authority to exercise special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction, a tribe can credibly raise numerous
arguments to rebut the defendant’s arguments discussed above. A tribe
could cite history and early treaties just as easily as a defendant, but for the
opposite purpose: to show that early treaties did in fact recognize inherent
tribal authority to try and punish non-Indians. 131 Further, pre-Oliphant
tribal codes asserted criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.132
The tribe could also draw easy analogies to Lara: The Duro fix language
at issue in Lara and the VAWA 2013 language at issue here contain very
similar clauses recognizing and affirming tribes’ inherent sovereignty.133 The
statutory inherent-power language was important to the Court’s decision in
Lara,134 so it should carry weight as a signal of congressional intent here.135
130 Id. A tribe might also defend special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction by arguing
“hypothetical consent,” whereby consent is presumed when “a reasonable person subjected to
government control would consent to such control.” Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal
Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 973, 991 (2010). Professor Fletcher suggests that
“Justice Kennedy's rhetoric invoking the consent of the governed rings hollow at least in cases
where a reasonable person would not object to tribal laws.” Id. at 991-92. But allowing
hypothetical consent in a civil matter is not the same as doing so in a criminal matter, where more
fundamental intrusions on personal liberty are at stake. See Gede, supra note 1, at 43 (contrasting
the civil and criminal contexts). A hypothetical-consent argument would appear to respond
inadequately to the political representation concerns that VAWA 2013 presents.
131 See supra Section I.A (explaining how the early treaties could support both broad and
narrow views of inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants).
132 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 (1978) (“Of the 127 reservation
court systems that currently exercise criminal jurisdiction in the United States, 33 purport to
extend that jurisdiction to non-Indians.”).
133 Compare Act of Nov. 5, 1990, sec. 8077(b), § 201(2), 104 Stat. at 1892 (“[T]he inherent
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, [includes the power] to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians[.]”), with 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. 2013) (“[T]he inherent power
of [a participating tribe,] hereby recognized and affirmed, [includes the power] to exercise special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.”).
Part IV, infra, discusses Congress’s role in more detail and focuses on the possible significance
of the congressional plenary power doctrine.
134 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 199; see also id. at 211 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress was
careful to rely on the theory of inherent sovereignty, and not on a delegation. . . . I would take
Congress at its word.”).
135 The actual legislative history of VAWA 2013’s Indian country provisions also supports the
notion that Congress intended special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction to flow from
inherent tribal sovereignty. See S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 n.23 (2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
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Additionally, the expansion of tribal criminal jurisdiction is narrow,136 and
the Court upheld the Duro fix in Lara because it made a similarly “limited”
change to the existing tribal criminal jurisdiction.137 VAWA 2013’s special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction extends tribal criminal jurisdiction
to a narrow subset of possible non-Indian defendants, whose prosecutions
must have specific territorial, personal, subject-matter, and rights-based
prerequisites required by statute.138
To the extent that a court may want to defer to the Executive Branch,139
it is noteworthy that federal administrators support special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction as it was enacted in VAWA 2013. In fact, the
key VAWA 2013 Indian country provisions were first drafted and proposed
by the Department of Justice in 2011.140 And the Department of Justice has
made at least one federal–tribal agreement in which it designated a tribal
prosecutor as a “Special Assistant U.S. Attorney with expanded authority
over domestic violence cases.”141

indicated that Congress has the power to recognize and thus restore tribes’ ‘inherent power’ to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians and non-Indians.” (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206-12 (1978))); see also Singh, supra note 7, at 218 (summarizing the
legislative history).
136 See supra Section II.A.
137 Lara, 541 U.S. at 204 (majority opinion).
138 See supra Section II.A.
139 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 205 (noting that the shared presumption of the Executive Branch,
Congress, and the lower courts would carry considerable weight); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831) (holding nonjusticiable the Cherokee Nation’s suit for relief against the
state of Georgia’s efforts to obtain control over tribal lands, and noting that the matter was “too
much [like] the exercise of political power to be within the proper province of the judicial
department”). See generally 13C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3534.2 (2014) (discussing how federal Indian law cases have invoked the political
question doctrine to defer to the Executive Branch’s judgment about Indian policy).
140 See Letter from Tony West, Acting Assoc. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Tribal Leader (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.tribal-institute.org/download/Drug%20Court/Invitation
%20to%20Tribal%20Consultation%20April%202013.pdf [http://perma.cc/AU5X-YL2X] (“[B]oth
[sections 904 and 908 of VAWA 2013] . . . were initially drafted and proposed to Congress by the
Department of Justice in 2011.”).
141 Chris Winters, Tulalips Wield New Power Against Domestic Violence, HERALDNET (July 14,
2014, 9:17 PM), http://heraldnet.com/article/20140714/NEWS01/140719464/Tulalips-wield-newpower-against-domestic-violence [http://perma.cc/92FX-FZL8]. The designation “Special U.S.
Attorney” could appear to imply that the tribal prosecutor acts under delegated federal authority,
but the Tulalip Tribes have received pilot project approval to exercise special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction in their own tribal courts and using their own tribal judges. See OFFICE OF
THE RESERVATION A TTORNEY, TULALIP TRIBES OF WASH., TULALIP TRIBES FINAL
APPLICATION QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE VAWA PILOT PROJECT ON TRIBAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION
(2013),
http://www.justice.gov/tribal/docs/appl-questionnaire-tulalip.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KHD6-353G]; see also VAWA 2013 Pilot Project, supra note 84 (noting that the
Tulalip Tribes had received pilot-project approval).
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Last but not least, tribes can cite compelling policy considerations to
support upholding special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction as flowing
from inherent tribal sovereignty. Most compellingly, expanded tribal
jurisdiction seeks to ameliorate the much-documented high rate of domestic
violence against Indian women, which is perpetuated by the law
enforcement gap in prosecutions of non-Indians in Indian country. 142
Furthermore, from an institutional competence perspective, a tribe could
argue—and cite Lara for the proposition—that Congress is better equipped
than the Court to resolve and decide these jurisdictional issues.143
As the past two Sections detail, colorable arguments exist on both sides
of the inherent tribal sovereignty question. But one of the arguments—the
weight of congressional intent144—carries such historical force in federal
Indian law145 that it could play more than the supporting role that it did in
Lara.146 The next Part takes a brief look at the congressional plenary power
doctrine and how advocates and courts could give it a leading role in
litigation over special domestic violence jurisdiction’s future.

142 See S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 7-9 (2012) (acknowledging and describing the “crisis” of
domestic violence and sexual assault against tribal victims); AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 8, at 2
(reporting that Indian women “are more than 2.5 times more likely to be raped or sexually
assaulted than women in the USA in general”); Singh, supra note 7, at 198-99 (summarizing the
“dire” need for more protection for Indian women against domestic and sexual violence); Laird,
supra note 12 (reporting that “two out of five Indian women reported being battered in their
lifetimes” and that eighty-eight percent of perpetrators of violent crimes against Indian women are
non-Indian); see also supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text (discussing the enforcement gap).
143 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 205 (expressing disapproval for the Court “second-guessing” the
political branches’ determinations); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 706-07 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“The touchstone in determining the extent to which citizens can be subject to the
jurisdiction of Indian tribes, therefore, is whether such jurisdiction is acceptable to Congress.”).
144 See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
145 See infra Section IV.A for historical background.
146 The Lara opinion mentioned Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs as just one of
six reasons for finding inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. See Lara, 541
U.S. at 200 (discussing Congress’s “plenary and exclusive” powers in the Indian law arena); id. at
200-07 (listing and discussing six justifications for upholding the Duro fix).
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IV. CONGRESS’S PLENARY POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS AND HOW
IT COULD AFFECT SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION
A. The Congressional Plenary Power Doctrine
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Congress’s plenary power over
Indian affairs became a central tenet of federal Indian law.147 The major case
distilling this principle is United States v. Kagama from 1886.148 In Kagama,
the Supreme Court derived the plenary power principle from tribes’ status
as domestic dependent nations149: “The power of the General Government
over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those
among whom they dwell.” 150 The Court found federal plenary power
necessary to protect the tribes from often-malicious state governments.151
Of course, federal plenary power also meant that little could protect the
tribes from malicious acts of the federal government itself.152
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Court began using the word
“plenary” to describe the scope of Congress’s power over Indian affairs.153
147 See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 195, 207, 212-19 (1984) (labeling “1877-1930’s” as “The Plenary Power Era,” and
recounting the plenary power doctrine’s rise during that period).
148 118 U.S. 375 (1886); see also Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 31, 34 (1996) (“Kagama was the first case in which the Supreme Court essentially
embraced the doctrine that Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs.”).
149 See supra notes 36–37 for a discussion about similar reasoning used in Oliphant to justify
the lack of inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
150 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
151 See id. (“Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where [Indians] are found
are often their deadliest enemies.”). In the nineteenth century, non-Indian settlers seeking land in
the western states were particularly hostile to Indians there, and newly formed state governments
sometimes endorsed anti-Indian actions—including state-sanctioned murders of Indians. See, e.g.,
gjohnsit, The Great California Genocide, DAILY KOS (Aug. 14, 2008) http://www.dailykos.com/
story / 2008 / 08 / 15 / 567667 / -The-Great-California-Genocide [http://perma.cc / 9P9C-5NM8]
(reporting that the state of California “paid about $1.1 Million in 1852 to militias to hunt down and
kill [I]ndians”). Of course, the federal government was also responsible for its share of Indian
massacres. See generally Indian Massacre, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Indian_massacre [http://perma.cc/QM44-P8D6] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (listing Indian
killings in history and including those perpetrated by both state and federal forces in the
nineteenth century).
152 See Newton, supra note 147, at 216-28 (elaborating on how during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, “[federal] policymakers denied tribal Indians the basic freedoms
accorded other Americans” and cited the plenary power doctrine as their justification).
153 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the tribal
relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning . . . .”); Frank R.
Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D. L. REV. 239, 247 (1991) (citing
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In the 1903 case Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Court noted that Congress had
exercised plenary power over tribal relations “from the beginning,” and so
Indian affairs “were solely within the domain of legislative authority.”154
What is more, the Court ruled that Congress’s actions in this domain were
“conclusive upon the courts.”155 As Professor Pommersheim has written,
this doctrine, “in its potentially sweeping and pristine form, is awesome” in
scope. 156 Not only does it endorse congressional authority to legislate
without limitation, but it also exempts that authority from judicial review.157
The congressional plenary power doctrine has endured to the present
day.158 It was cited in Lara to support the Court’s finding of inherent tribal
authority to prosecute and punish nonmember Indians.159 And as recently as
2014, the Supreme Court has noted Congress’s “plenary control” over
Indian tribes.160 Because of its historical import, the plenary power doctrine
could emerge as a key topic for courts to consider in their deliberations over
special domestic violence jurisdiction’s constitutionality.
B. How the Congressional Plenary Power Doctrine Could Affect Special Domestic
Violence Criminal Jurisdiction
A court could follow Lara and treat congressional plenary power the way
the Supreme Court did in that case: as a mere additional argument to
support finding inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians.161 But a court could also reverse the order of operations and address
the plenary power doctrine first: under this analytical route, a court might
hold that if Congress has explicitly legislated that special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction is an exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty, then

Lone Wolf as the first instance in which the Supreme Court expounded on the “extravagant
concept” of congressional plenary power).
154 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565, 567-68.
155 Id. at 567-68.
156 Pommersheim, supra note 153, at 247.
157 Id.
158 See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN L AW, supra note 6, § 5.02[1]
(discussing how courts continue to recognize Congress’s “plenary and exclusive authority over
Indian affairs” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
159 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress
broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently
described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”); see also supra note 146 (explaining the role played by the
plenary power doctrine in Lara’s reasoning).
160 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014).
161 See supra note 146 for a discussion of the Court’s use of the plenary power doctrine in
Lara.
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Congress’s word is dispositive. 162 Following this reasoning, courts are
beholden to Congress under the plenary power doctrine, and so they simply
cannot overturn Congress’s explicit legislation.
This second analytical route is deceptively simple. To be sure, it quickly
and easily answers the inherent tribal sovereignty question in the
affirmative. But a more complex analysis lurks in the background. Instead of
scrutinizing the metes and bounds of inherent tribal sovereignty, a court
might be asked to determine the scope of Congress’s plenary power: Does it
allow Congress, in the Indian law context, to deny non-Indian U.S. citizens
the federal constitutional rights they would otherwise receive in a state or
federal prosecution? 163 Indeed, this question was one mentioned and
avoided by the Lara Court, which chose not to address “potential
constitutional limits on congressional efforts to legislate far more radical
changes in tribal status.”164
The sources and scope of Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs
are myriad and complex,165 and giving them a thorough treatment in the
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction context is beyond the scope
of this Comment. Can Congress deny non-Indian defendants their rights to
an Article III judge appointed pursuant to Article II of the U.S.
Constitution?166 Can Congress refuse non-Indian defendants the grand jury
indictments and other constitutional rights they would receive in a federal
prosecution?167 If a court relies on congressional plenary power to uphold
tribes’ inherent authority to exercise special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction, then these lurking constitutional questions could rise to the
surface.168
162 See generally Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1903) (declaring congressional
action “conclusive upon the courts” when it concerns Indian affairs); supra note 155 and
accompanying text.
163 For domestic violence crimes committed on Indian country in the absence of special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indian defendants rests with
the state and with the federal government. See generally supra notes 4–8 (describing the
jurisdictional framework in Indian country). States need not provide defendants with all their
federal constitutional rights, but they must provide defendants with certain rights—like Miranda
rights—that tribes are not required to provide. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
164 Lara, 541 U.S. at 205.
165 See generally Newton, supra note 147 (providing an extensive treatment of the issue).
166 See supra notes 14, 111–17 and accompanying text (discussing these concerns).
167 See supra notes 99–117 and accompanying text (discussing the possible differences between
a tribal prosecution and a federal prosecution).
168 One might answer these constitutional questions with the position that tribes must offer
defendants at least as many protections as they would receive in a state prosecution. E-mail from
Troy Eid, Chairman, Indian Law & Order Comm’n, to author (Sept. 5, 2015) (on file with
author). For instance, the Indian Law and Order Commission, appointed to study these issues by
the Tribal Law and Order Act, has taken the view that tribes should “ensure that defendants’
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Thus, a tricky analysis lies ahead for a court adjudicating special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction’s constitutionality, even if it relies
on congressional plenary power in the first instance to justify tribes’
inherent authority to exercise special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction. Either (1) the court relies on plenary power and should
consider the permissible scope of that power, or (2) the court must follow
the template created by Lara and analyze myriad possible authorities on
inherent tribal sovereignty 169 to determine whether special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction qualifies as an exercise of that inherent tribal
sovereignty.170
V. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE SUPREME COURT
HOLDINGS
If in the future the Supreme Court rules on whether special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction flows from inherent tribal sovereignty, 171
VAWA 2013’s current jurisdictional framework could be dismantled,
upheld, or perhaps subjected to a tribe-by-tribe analysis. And even if the
Supreme Court decides the issues from the congressional plenary power
perspective,172 similar outcomes are possible.
If the Court were to rule that no inherent tribal sovereignty exists to
prosecute non-Indians, then, as noted above, savvy litigants could potentially
engineer the dismantling of the entire jurisdictional framework as enacted,
by arguing that tribes’ delegated federal authority violates structural
guarantees in the federal Constitution.173 Despite VAWA’s constitutional
“catch-all” provision, valiant tribes’ efforts to enforce the full panoply of
Federal constitutional rights are fully protected” but “retain retain full and final authority over the
definition of the crime [and] sentencing options.” INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A
ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFE: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT &
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (Nov. 2013), http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/
report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native_America_Safer-Full.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F863WLNV]; E-mail from Troy Eid, supra (interpreting the roadmap as taking the position that “all
U[.]S[.] citizens, Indian and non-Indian alike, must have their federal constitutional rights
protected by tribal courts at an equivalent level to what states provide”). See generally INDIAN L.
& ORD. COMMISSION, http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/index.html [http://perma.cc/96YWHQ89] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (providing background about the Commission).
169 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 200-07 (listing and discussing six justifications); supra Sections
III.B–III.C (listing and discussing multiple arguments for and against inherent tribal authority to
exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction).
170 See supra Section III.A for an explanation of how the scope of inherent tribal sovereignty
affects the constitutionality of special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction.
171 See supra Part III for possible arguments and reasoning in this vein.
172 See supra Part IV for considerations surrounding this alternative analytical route.
173 See supra notes 111–117 and accompanying text.
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federal constitutional rights, and careful federal–tribal prosecutorial
cooperation, tribes (and the federal government) are unlikely to find a way
to address all the constitutional concerns in a way that allows the current
jurisdictional framework to continue as envisioned by Congress.174
From the congressional plenary power perspective, the Supreme Court
might hold that Congress’s plenary power does not include the power to
deny non-Indian defendants their Article II and Article III rights. Because
tribes would not be able to provide these rights to non-Indian defendants,175
the jurisdictional framework envisioned by VAWA 2013 would be similarly
dismantled.
If the Court were to hold that tribes do have inherent authority to
prosecute non-Indians, then special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction
would be permissible using the structure envisioned by Congress. The “dual
sovereignty” doctrine would quash defendants’ double jeopardy
arguments. 176 Other federal constitutional issues would not present
problems, so long as tribes are careful to provide defendants with statutory
rights required under ICRA and VAWA 2013, as well as any rights courts
may find necessary under VAWA 2013’s constitutional “catch-all”
provision.177 Similarly, Article II and Article III concerns would not hold
water, because Article II’s appointment provisions apply only to “officers of
the United States,” 178 and Article III’s life tenure and compensation
provisions apply only to judges vested with “the judicial power of the
United States.” 179 Tribal judges exercising inherent tribal authority to
adjudicate would not be federal officers and would not be vested with
federal judicial power. Article II appointment and Article III life tenure and
compensation would not constrain their authority.
The Court could also reach this result from the congressional plenary
power perspective. If the Court were to uphold the unlimited scope of
Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs,180 non-Indian defendants’ loss
of federal constitutional rights would not pose a concern—in Indian country,
Congress’s word trumps all. Special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction,

174
175
176
177
178
179
180

See id.
See id.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.A.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
Id. art. III, § 1..
See generally Section IV.A (providing background on the plenary power doctrine).
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as envisioned by Congress, could continue unabated—so long as it has
Congress’s imprimatur.181
One other possible approach the Court could take is a tribe-by-tribe
approach, where the source of each tribe’s special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction—be it inherent tribal sovereignty, delegated federal authority,
or Congress’s plenary power—depends on fact-based determinations. For
example, the Court might hold that a given tribe has inherent special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians if and only if the
tribe in question has a compelling historical argument for criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. Each tribe might be required to justify its assertion of
inherent sovereignty by reference to historical treaties, historical tribal
practice, and the like. The Court has taken a similar tribe-by-tribe approach
in its cases on whether surplus land acts have diminished Indian
reservations: some surplus land acts diminish Indian reservations and others
do not, depending on “the language of the act and the circumstances
surrounding its passage.”182 But though a tribe-by-tribe approach may be
more equitable in some respects,183 it would further complicate an already
complicated jurisdictional framework. Because of the allotment policies of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, federal, state, and tribal
law enforcement authorities sometimes share jurisdiction over
“checkerboard” lands where enforcement jurisdiction varies by the
individual land parcel.184 And, given that Congress has only opened special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction to those tribes who can afford to
provide defendants with the rights guaranteed by VAWA 2013,185 Congress
itself has created a tribe-specific means of allowing and disallowing tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Adding another layer of complexity would
181 Of course, what Congress gives, Congress can take away. Even if tribes have inherent
authority to prosecute and punish non-Indians, Congress can impose restrictions on that inherent
authority just as easily as it can relax restrictions. Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196
(2004) (concluding that Congress may “relax restrictions” on tribal authority, but after noting that
“the political branches have, over time, placed [those restrictions] on the exercise of a tribe’s
inherent legal authority”).
182 Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 469 (1984); see also id. at 469-70 n.10 (discussing examples).
183 See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069,
1114 (2004) (warning against “the pitfalls of making sweeping claims” about Indian tribes, because
“meaningful variations across the Indian tribes make for varying degrees of federal [and tribal]
power”).
184 See generally CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE
NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 24-30 (6th ed. 2010) (describing allotment policies and
providing an illustrative map of the checkerboard land ownership that resulted on the Lac Courte
Oreilles Reservation in Wisconsin). These jurisdictional complexities deter effective law
enforcement. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 8, at 27-39.
185 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
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likely do more harm than good, so it seems unlikely that the Court will
adopt this approach.
CONCLUSION: FROM WHAT DOES INHERENT TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
DERIVE?
Oliphant derived the lack of inherent tribal sovereignty to prosecute
non-Indians from its conception of history and of Indian tribes’ dependent
status.186 Duro derived the lack of inherent tribal sovereignty to prosecute
nonmember Indians from the notion that tribe members give voluntary
consent to tribal jurisdiction.187 And Lara derived its finding of inherent
tribal sovereignty to prosecute nonmember Indians from congressional
intent and the notion that Congress can relax federally imposed restrictions
on inherent tribal sovereignty.188 From what will the VAWA 2013 test case
derive inherent tribal sovereignty—or the lack thereof?
This Comment has highlighted a number of considerations, any of
which could be used by the courts to justify or refute inherent tribal
authority to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction under
VAWA 2013. Depending on a given court’s preferred justifications—
history, congressional power, voluntary political membership, etc.—it can
reasonably rule either for or against inherent tribal authority to exercise
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. For non-Indian defendants,
the scope of their federal constitutional rights is at stake. For the tribes,
what it means to be sovereign.
The tribes, however, might have more at stake than just their authority
to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. A decision on
their inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians will affect not just
their jurisdiction under VAWA 2013, but also any future statutory grants of
jurisdiction to criminally prosecute non-Indians. Indeed, some tribal
advocates see special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction as a stepping
stone to complete tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders for
crimes committed in Indian country—a complete Oliphant override. 189
Depending on how courts rule, VAWA 2013’s special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction could be the dead end for these hopes—or it could be
the beginning of a new era, in which tribes enjoy a breadth of criminal

186
187
188
189

See supra Section I.B.
See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
See Laird, supra note 12 (“[M]any Indian legal observers see Section 904 [of VAWA 2013]
as a major step toward safer reservations, and, perhaps, full tribal criminal jurisdiction.”).
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jurisdiction unprecedented since, perhaps, before the founding of the
United States.

